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Abstract It has become almost a truism to describe the interaction between research ethics
committees and researchers as being marred by distrust and conflict. The ethical conduct of
researchers is increasingly a matter of institutional concern because of the degree to which
non-compliance with national standards can expose the entire institution to risk. This has
transformed research ethics into what some have described as a research ethics industry. In
an operational sense, there is considerable focus on modifying research behaviour through a
combination of education and sanctions. The assessment of whether a researcher is ‘ethical’
is too often based on whether they submit their work for review by an ethics committee.
However, is such an approach making a useful contribution to the actual ethical conduct of
research and the protection of the interests of participants? Does a focus on ethical review
minimise institutional risk? Instead it has been suggested that ethics committees may be
distorting or frustrating useful research and are promoting a culture of either mindless rule
following or frustrated resistance. An alternative governance approach is required. There is
a need for a strong institutional focus on promoting and supporting the reflective practice of
researchers through every stage of their work. By situating research ethics within the
broader framework of institutional governance, this paper suggests it is possible to establish
arrangements that actually facilitate excellent and ethical research.
Keywords Ethics committee . Institutional governance . Research ethics .
Research practice . Rules
All is Far From Quiet on the Western Front
Too often the climate between research administrators, ethics committee members and
researchers is acrimonious. It seems there is an emerging culture of distrust between
researchers and research ethics committees. The regulation of ethical conduct in human
research has become something of an industry (Ashcroft 1999, p14), where a proliferation
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of rules has created an ‘out of control bureaucracy’ that often impedes the conduct of
research (Haggerty 2004, pp. 392–394).
It is not difficult to find examples of researcher frustration with the behaviour of ethics
committees (Furedi 2002) or questions about the sustainability of the existing ethical review
systems (Komesaroff 2002). Furthermore, there are repeated suggestions that the
functioning of ethics committees may actually encourage an abrogation of the responsibility
of researchers to reflect upon the ethical issues associated with their own research (Loff and
Black 2004; Schwartz 2000). There are also warnings that the existing approach to the
ethical review of research may actually be hampering (or ‘distorting’) useful research (Israel
2004, p. 6; Hoonaard et al. 2004, p. 11).
Unfortunately, national research ethics frameworks can often be treated by ethics
committees, administrators and institutions as though they were to be read and applied
literally without a reflection on the specifics of a particular individual case. This can
encourage a mindset that if an approach to an ethical dilemma is not explicitly anticipated
in the national guidelines it is not permissible. It also tends to result in specific provisions of
the guidelines being applied in a one-size-fits-all manner, where the realities and context of
the specific project are ignored. Experience suggests that this kind of situation most
frequently occurs when an over-worked ethics committee is confronted with a research
design, approach or situation which is unfamiliar.
It is important to remember that, in many jurisdictions, responsibility for the conduct of
researchers, and the ability to take action in response to inappropriate conduct, resides at the
institutional level. An important first step in the improving the institutional climate between
researchers and research ethics committees is recognising that the ethical conduct of
researchers is an institutional governance issue, which should be imbedded within the
institution’s broader governance framework.
Institutional Risk
Concurrently with the concerns about the operation of research ethics systems, ‘regulators’
are placing an increasing focus on the responsibilities of institutions to ensure the ethical
conduct of research conducted within the institution (Breen 2002). In many jurisdictions
institutions must ensure researchers are trained in their ethical obligations. Institutions must
also have systems to ensure compliance with the national standards and to actively monitor
the conduct of researchers. A failure to meet these institutional responsibilities can attract
serious penalties – for example all research funding1 to the institution may be suspended
(for discussion about the ‘Johns Hopkins case’, see Abate and Russel 2001; Hotchin 2001;
Keiger and de Pasquale 2002). Indeed, there are some very public examples of an entire
institution being penalised for the actions of a single research team and/or because of
perceived systemic failures within the institution.
This has resulted in a climate where institutions feel unable to trust researchers to ‘do the
right thing’. Instead, many institutions turn to a bureaucratic structure to ensure compliance
with ethical and regulatory standards (ALRC and AHEC 2001, pp. 109–110; Dodds et al.
1 The research funding to an institution comes from multiple sources, so any impact upon funding (e.g. from
the National Health and Medical Research Council) might initially impact upon a section of research funding
to the institution. However, given the degree to which multiple funding bodies require institutional
compliance with the relevant national framework, there may be a cascading effect that impacts upon most, or
at least a significant proportion of an institution’s funding.
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1994, p. 19). This in turn perpetuates an adversarial tone to the interactions between
researchers and ethics committees (Shaul 2002). In such a context, ethics committees are
perceived as having a ‘policing’ role, with the objective of catching researchers in
wrongdoing.
The combination of an institutional focus on compliance, with a view that researchers
regard the work of HRECs with something between truculence, petulance or ignorance,
appears to dominate the thinking of a majority of administrators, ethics committees and
even regulators.
This is the perceived ‘compliance problem’ that must be tackled – largely to safeguard
the institution from the serious consequences of a regulator or funding body judging the
institution to be non-compliant.
The obvious limitation of this increasingly dominant way of viewing the interaction
between researchers and research ethics committees is that it tends to be conceptually
constraining. Within this constraint, any reflection on the role or operation of ethics
committees tends to be almost exclusively focussed upon the goal of ensuring compliance,
and compliance tends to be understood in terms of a researcher completing an application
form for review by an ethics committee (Loff and Black 2004).
In effect, institutions perceive the ‘compliance problem’ to be any researcher who does
not submit their work for ethical review or otherwise adhere to the institution’s research
ethics processes. However, in fact the ‘compliance problem’ might actually be the
deleterious impact upon research practice when an institution relies upon directive rules and
the threat of sanctions to modify researcher behaviour.
The limited perspective of focussing on ethical review as a question of compliance ignores
the interesting question of why a researcher, who might otherwise ascribe to the highest
ethical standards and holds a very real personal commitment to the protection of research
participants, might adamantly refuse to submit his work to review by a research ethics
committee. It also glosses over the problem of a researcher who dutifully submits her work to
ethical review, but in fact only begrudgingly pays lip service to the principles that supposedly
underpin that review. As noted by Haggerty (2004, p. 410) a schism has emerged between the
actual ethical conduct in research and the mechanism of following the rules.
One of the reasons governing researcher practice can be so problematic is the realities of
academic practice within a multi-disciplinary university, which can often be spread over
geographically dispersed campuses. It is practically impossible for an institution to know
exactly how individual researchers are conducting themselves. Given the degree to which
inappropriate behaviour by even an individual researcher can expose the institution to risk,
this creates understandable anxiety and a desire to try to centrally regulate conduct in a way
that can be demonstrated to an external agency.
Could it be that, we have allowed the goal of demonstrable compliance to subsume the
principle of facilitating excellent ethical research and protecting the rights of research
participants? It seems that in our rush to minimise institutional risk and to have a ‘sound’
governance framework, somehow research ethics has become about expertly filling out a
form for a committee, rather than an ongoing active reflection on important issues and their
application to useful practice.
The Typical Approach to the ‘Compliance Problem’
In many cases, the typical governance approach to the ‘compliance problem’, seems to be
predicated on an unquestioning acceptance of what Woodward (1994) described as
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‘Weberian Orthodoxy’. This approach assumes that the best way to regulate practice within
an organisation is through the release of detailed centrally formulated rules that are intended
to closely direct practice in an absolute way. The rapidly increasing layers of rules and
expanding role for ethics committees is a manifestation of this ‘Orthodoxy’ (Haggerty
2004, p.394). Also implicit in this dominant approach to research ethics systems is the use
of what Hart described as a sanctions and enforcement model of control – where it is
assumed that if the mere existence of the rules is not enough to modify behaviour then the
threat of severe penalties will be (Hart 1999).
A typical symptom of this orthodoxy, are ‘research ethics educational’ strategies that
focus upon the correct completion of forms, the mechanism by which work is submitted
for ethical review, and the textual features of informed consent materials. Often absent
from such programs is much in the way of discussion about ethical conduct during the
research, or resources to assist a reflective approach to the ethical challenges researchers
might face.
In fairness to the typical ethics committee, it should be acknowledged that a combination
of crippling workload and limited resources can makes it difficult for a committee to do
anything other than review the huge volume of new applications submitted to each meeting
(McNeill et al. 1990; Federman; Hanna et al. 2003, pp. 8–9). There is simply not enough
resources or time to enable the committee to be proactive in other areas (Breen et al. 2005,
p. 469). This overwhelming workload is often cited as the reason a HREC does not take a
more active role in educational strategies or policy development (Frew 2001, p. 67).
But it could reasonably be asked, is the heavy workload of ethics committees and
administrators really the source of the problem, or is it a symptom? As long as
administrators and committee members continue to accept without question the notion
that tackling the ‘compliance problem’ is a priority issue and the best way of tackling this
problem is by modifying the behaviour/knowledge level of researchers through threats,
‘evangelical education’, or better ‘form filling’, then it might usefully be asked whether
more time or resources would necessarily improve the climate between researchers and
research ethics committees. Indeed there is a very real risk that greater resourcing for a
research ethics committee’s compliance/educational strategies might in fact compound the
problem. An educational program based solely upon the goal of reducing compliance
problems by addressing ‘researcher ignorance of ethical standards’, might easily be
construed as extremely patronising by researchers and further poison the relationship
between committees and researchers.
Limitations of the Typical Approach
There are sources of evidence available that point to limitations of the typical approach to
research ethics.
Firstly, there continue to be public cases arising from breaches in ethical standards by
researchers and/or failures in institutional research ethics systems (Unknown 2000; Oakes
2002 p450; Shaul 2002). Furthermore, some analyses of research practice point to a
worrying level of ethical problems (Dotterweich and Garrison 1998, p. 444; Payne 2000,
pp. 2–7; Thompson 1984).
Secondly, there is a significant body of commentary from researchers that point to
serious concerns about the approach to the application of research ethics systems
(Fitzgerald and Yule 2004, pp. 36–38; Oakes 2002 pp. 445–446; Singer 1989).
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Thirdly, there are worrying indications that research designs are being compromised or
‘disfigured’ by existing ethical review processes (Haggerty 2004, p. 412; Hoonaard 2004,
pp. 11–12; Iphofen 2004), or that researchers may actually be presenting a distorted
description of their research to get it past an ethics committee (Shore and West 2005).
Lastly, the simple fact that there is such an energetic international discussion about the
sustainability of research ethics systems (Ramcharan and Cutcliffe 2001; Dodds 2002;
Fitzgerald and Yule 2004) serves as indication that there is a level of institutional disquiet
about the appropriateness and results of the current approach.
Problems in the Breach
It is perhaps tempting for research administrators and ethics committee members to blame
any problems with the typical approach to research ethics on our respective national
frameworks.
Certainly, in Australia, the current edition of the National Statement on Ethical Conduct
in Research Involving Humans (NHMRC 1999) is not without its limitations and short
comings. The National Statement cites biomedical texts, such as the Declaration of
Helsinki as the source of its authority. At the same time the National Statement fails to
acknowledge other sources of ethical guidance for researchers outside of the health
sciences, such as codes of conduct for psychologists (Dodds et al. 1994, p. 16). Much of the
language and specific matters addressed within the National Statement are focussed on
biomedical issues, with apparent assumptions about research practice that are more relevant
to quantitative approaches. Fortunately, it appears that the next edition of the National
Statement will address many of these issues and be far more relevant to the practice of
research outside of the health sciences.
Despite the temptation to blame our current difficulties on the relevant national
guidelines, it should be acknowledged that, even when a national framework articulates
principles with broad application to all human research, the way in which they can be
applied at the institutional level is the source of many of the difficulties. In his report for the
New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Israel (2004) quotes specific
cases of how the sometimes bizarre demands of an ethics committee can seriously impact
upon the conduct of criminological research. This situation results in delays, considerable
frustration and distrust, and can result in research being distorted to the point where it is
unworkable. In these cases, the problem was not whether there was dispute over the validity
of an ethical principle, but instead related to a policy position and approach adopted by an
ethics committee.
My own experience during the last ten years working with ethics committees in
Australia, Canada, England and Vietnam is that committee members often feel isolated
from, and under appreciated by, their own institution. This isolation can lead to a sense that
members are charged with “protecting the institution”, but are unsure whether the
institution supports them. When combined with a committee’s phenomenal workload
(Shaul 2002; Allen 2005, p. 3), this insecurity and isolation can often result in a committee
taking what Haggerty (2004, p. 412) described as an overly cautious and conservative
positions on issues – even when the national framework enables them the freedom to assess
the specifics of a case and consider alternative approaches (Haggerty 2004, p. 412).
The approach to multi-site research is a good example of where ‘failures’ in the current
approach to research ethics can occur at the institutional, rather than at the national level.
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This is an area that is a common source of criticism of human research systems.
Researchers frequently complain about the inefficiencies, delays and frustrations associated
with having to apply to multiple ethics committees for one study2.
This occurs in Australia despite the fact that the current edition of the National Statement
urges institutions to “minimise unnecessary duplication in review of multi-centre research”
and suggests an ethics committee can decide to “accept the decision of another institution,
organisation or HREC in relation to multi-centre research” National Statement (1999).
Gold and Dewa (2005) point to similar problems with the processing of multi-site
research in the USA. Like Australia, the American system allows for, and even actively
encourages, ethics committees to accept the review decision of another committee for
multi-site research (NBAC 2001, p. 122).
In each case, the problems and frustrations faced by researchers conducting work at
multiple sites has very little to do with the relevant national research ethics framework, but
a great deal to do with the approach at the institutional level. It seems there is an active
resistance of the use of reciprocal or centralised review solutions – even when the national
frameworks encourages such an approach (Lux et al. 2000, p. 1183).
When discussing this issue with ethic committee members and administrators I have
frequently heard comments justifying this kind of resistance on the basis of the committee’s
duty of care, responsibility and culpability. Such comments are often wrapped in
deceptively compelling references to the law and insurance. Yet the implicit principles
that underpin such arguments rarely seem to have been tested with the institution’s legal
area. Furthermore, as noted above, any refusal to engage in some form of reciprocal or fast-
tracked review is contrary to the specific provisions of the relevant national framework.
An institution involved in a multi-site project, does indeed have its own governance
responsibilities for that research –including a duty of care to staff, students or patients.
However, the presence of such responsibilities does not create a requirement for review by
a research ethics committee. It does require that the institution have appropriate governance
systems to ensure that the risks and issues are appropriately assessed and addressed.
Rather than leaving ethics committees to struggle with the question of their responsibility,
duty of care and accountability, there is a need for an institutional-level policy decision about
how to handle multi-site research, including issues such as reciprocity.
Facilitation and Legitimacy as a New Theoretical Model for Governance Systems
If we are to tackle the goals of managing institutional risk, supporting ethical conduct in
research, and protecting the interests of research participants then what is required is a
complete departure from the existing approach to research ethics.
No longer should we allow research ethics, and research ethics committees to operate
independently of an institution’s broad approach to research governance. No longer should
we allow ‘doing research ethics’ to mean filling out a form and interacting with an
overworked committee that is struggling to work out its place within the institution.
For local research ethics arrangements to have any hope of having a positive impact
upon the design and conduct of research, they must first be predicated on the goal of
facilitating excellent and ethical research.
2 For example, in 2005 this matter received considerable attention during the plenary and concurrent sessions
of both the NHMRC conference on human research ethics and the annual conference of the Australasian
Research Managers Society.
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I suspect that very few research administrators or research ethics committee members
would disagree that facilitating research is important. Indeed, in Australia the National
Statement (NHMRC 1999, p. 1) specifies that, in addition to its primary purpose of
safeguarding the rights and welfare of participants, “an important secondary purpose” is to
facilitate research. However, ethics committee members and administrators need to embrace
facilitation as a core element of the operation of an institutional research ethics system.
Rather than trying to catch researchers in wrongdoing or ‘educate them in ethics’, the whole
focus of the system becomes a collaborative exchange between the stakeholders.
Of course, that is not to imply that the primary objective of safeguarding the welfare
and rights of research participants should in any way be compromised. Embracing the
tenet of facilitation just means that the various players in the system try to work
collaboratively with researchers, rather than try to ‘police’ behaviour. In such an
approach, there is an attempt to build an equal partnership between researchers and the
ethics committee.
In her book on trust in society Misztal (1996, pp. 26–27) discussed how trust plays an
important role in the support for, and participation in, public policy. Misztal (1996,
pp. 245–269) suggested that the degree to which individuals see any exercise of public
power as legitimate is a fundamental factor in determining whether they will comply with
that power. I would suggest that a strength of this perspective on the interaction between
instruments of regulatory control and the behaviour of practitioners is that it recognises the
realities of decision making and practice in what Lash (1994, pp. 208–209) referred to as
post-modern organizations (Lash 1994, pp. 208–209). For example – researchers have a
degree of autonomy, they operate within fluid working arrangements and teams, and face a
dizzying array of challenges that defy any directive-rule-based attempt to regulate their
practice. It is simply disingenuous to assume that a central prescriptive rule can offer
applicable solutions to the ethical challenges that researcher will face.
We need to recognise that, especially for researchers in some disciplines, there may be
perceived legitimacy problems with the national research ethics framework. Consequently,
institutions have an important role to play in filling this legitimacy gap through the
implementation of local processes and practices that can be perceived as being more
relevant and applicable to the practice of researchers within the institution.
Rather than trying to use directive rules to prescribe conduct, an institution’s research
ethics arrangements need to encourage reflective practice where the researcher has an active
role in formulating, and justifying, the solution to the issue – not just at the point of seeking
ethical clearance, but throughout the entire life of a research project.
The Griffith Model
Griffith University is a multi-campus university based in the southeast corner of
Queensland, Australia. It is a vibrant and growing institution, within what is called the
Innovative Research Universities Australia group.
The situation in terms of the approach to human research ethics at Griffith University,
prior to 2003, was not that different from the problems and difficulties faced by many other
Australian universities. For a variety of historical and structural reasons, research ethics had
become isolated from the University’s broader research governance framework. This
situation compounded the tendency of the ethics committee to take a cautious and
conservative approach to risks and unfamiliar research designs. Furthermore, an
overwhelming workload and insufficient resourcing meant that much of the University’s
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guidelines had not been updated for a number of years and predate the release of the current
national research ethics framework.
The negative impact of this situation was most obviously discernible in three ways: (1)
The Director, Office for Research, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research), and even the
Vice-Chancellor, were receiving repeated complaints from senior researchers about “the
ethics problem”; (2) even though there was a continual growth in the amount of research
ethics activity, this was largely concentrated into a handful of broadly health-related
disciplinary areas; and (3) there was increasingly an adversarial, even besieged, tone to the
relationship between the HREC and the research community.
In 2003, the then Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research) commissioned a major review of
human research ethics at Griffith University. The report of the Research Ethics Review
2003 was endorsed at the executive level. This provided top level support for a reform
agenda.
A new model for the governance of ethical conduct of human research arose from this
review. The key features of this new model are outlined below.
Executive Officer Support The University created a new senior policy officer position, at
equivalent to senior lecturer level. Separate from the traditional secretariat support for the
ethics committee, this position performs an advisory, policy development and educational
role. Furthermore, there has been a limited ‘buy-out of the Chair and Deputy Chairperson of
the ethics committee.
Research Ethics Advisor network Every academic element of the University has appointed
one member of academic staff as a Research Ethics Advisor (REA) for their area. REAs
undertake a number of roles including: providing local ‘judgement free’ and discipline
relevant advice to students, supervisors and other researchers; delivering workshops in their
area; participating in the expedited review system (see below); advising the head of the
element on research ethics matters; and facilitating communication to and from the
committee.
Proportional Ethical Review The University now has three ethical review pathways, which
tie the amount of paperwork, the rigour of the review; and the processing time to a smart
assessment of the risks and ethical issues associated with the proposed work. Two of these
review pathways are online, with an online tool to assist the applicant accurately determine
the appropriate review pathway.
Research Ethics Manual The University has produced an online, booklet-based manual for
researchers. Each booklet is focussed on a particular ethical issue or research design (such
as online research). Even though the manual does outline external regulatory requirements
and approaches previously accepted by the ethics committee, these are not presented as
directive rules. Instead the Manual is intended to inform a researcher’s understanding of the
principles and to assist them to justify alternative approaches.
Case Study Training The approach to research ethics training within the University is not
based solely on the process of ethical review and better ‘form filling’. Instead, real cases are
used to explore issues that can be raised during the design, ethical review, conduct and
publishing of human research. This approach to training stresses a two-way learning
process, where the experience of researchers is fed back into the institutional approach to
governance.
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Targeted Arrangements The University has adopted special policies and processes
for research undertaken by coursework and undergraduate students, multisite research and
research involving ‘standard’ instruments. There are also supplementary processes for
research involving Indigenous Australians, clinical trials, and research conducted overseas.
The Griffith Experience: 2 Years On
At the time of writing, the ‘Griffith Model’ has been operating for just over 2 years. To
date, there has not been any systematic collection of data about the impacts of the ‘Griffith
Model’. However, there are some sources of data and testimony that make it possible to at
least suggest the degree to which the changes to governance at Griffith University have had
a significant and enduring positive impact.
Attitudes Towards Research Ethics
In 2005, the Office for Research at Griffith University was subject to a comprehensive
external review by a panel of executive-level academics and senior research administrators.
The review process involved the review panel meeting with a range of researchers and key
stakeholders, as well as considering confidential submissions from across the University.
In their written report noted (Glover et al. 2005):
& That the institution’s research community showed significant support for the
changes to the University human research ethics governance arrangements (p. 17);
& That there was “uniformly strong endorsement” for the University’s research ethics
system, which was described as “effective and responsive” (p. 8); and
& That the work and contribution of the new ethics team was greatly appreciated (p. 8).
Clearly this represents a significant turnaround in climate at Griffith University in only a
few short years. This major change in climate is also reflected in my anecdotal observations
and in the feedback that I continue to receive from researchers and support staff.
Participation Rate
In 2004/2005 a total of 559 applications for ethical review were submitted at Griffith
University, as opposed to 430 applications in 2003/2004, representing a 30% increase in
activity. This followed a 40% increase in activity 2003/2004, compared to 2002/2003. The
significant increase in new applications in 2004/2005 came at the same time as there was a
150% increase in variations to approved projects. As part of the ‘Griffith Model’, new
processes were implemented to make it easier for a research team to extend and vary an
approved protocol to cover the next phase of a research project. In practice a variation can
often negate the need for a research team to submit a new ethics application for a new phase
of previously approved research.
It is also worthwhile commenting on how the above activity is now spread across
individual University elements. During the period 2003–2005 some areas of the University
have seen massive increases in activity, such as: Environmental Planning; Film, Media and
Culture; Hospitality, Sport and Leisure; Information Computer Technology; Marketing; and
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the Queensland Conservatorium of Music. These are areas that traditionally had relatively
low levels of human research ethics activity.
To some degree, these increases in activity can be attributed to the maturing research
profile of Griffith University. However, clearly increases of the order reported above are not
reflected in improvements in the University’s grant success rates, publication rates and
research higher degree student completion rates. I would suggest that, to a large degree, the
massive jump in activity reflects a surge in researcher participation in, and engagement
with, the University’s governance framework. I would contend that the work to address the
‘legitimacy gap’ of the national framework and previous University arrangements has
resulted in not only more researchers electing to participate in the framework, but also a
more complete spread of this activity into disciplinary areas outside of the health sciences.
Client Service, Efficiency and Workload
In 2004/2005 almost 90% of Griffith University’s human research ethics activity was
reviewed via one of the two expedited review pathways (Allen 2005, p. 5). Coupled with
the variation mechanism, course clearances, approved protocol procedure and multi-site
arrangements this made a considerable contribution to the way in which the needs of
researchers (the clients of many of the systems) are met. In many cases, requests from
researchers were resolved in a matter of a few days.
The changes outlined to the University’s governance framework also generated
considerable administrative and committee efficiencies. For example, rather than the ethics
committee struggling through in excess of 30 applications at each of its monthly meetings,
the committee now reviews an average of five applications. Rather than making 20+ copies
of 30 applications, and posting these to each member, Office for Research needs only
expend a fraction of the resources to support the new multi-pathway review process. A
significant impact of this change is that the ethics committee now has time to actively
reflect upon policy issues and discuss emergent issues. The committee can also now afford
to take the time to carefully reflect upon the ethically sensitive research that is submitted for
full review.
It is unlikely that the previous University systems, resources and arrangements could
have coped with the recent increases in workload. Even the modest growth in activity seen
in the years prior to 2003 would probably have made the HREC’s workload unsustainable.
During this period the University has established a new medical school, and commenced
strategic collaborations with bodies such as the Queensland Institute of Medical Research.
Despite the extra volume and complexity arising from these institutional developments they
have not placed any significant strain on the governance framework or the HREC, because
of the reforms commenced in 2003.
Nevertheless, it would be extremely short-sighted to believe that further work is not
needed at Griffith University, or the challenges ahead will not demand further innovation.
Conclusion
The typical approach to research ethics is neither successful or desirable. In many cases it
generates a culture of distrust and resentment between researchers and research ethics
committees. At worst, the typical approach may be distorting or blocking useful research,
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without necessarily having a positive impact upon research practice or the interests of
research participants.
Institutions have an important role to play, by establishing local arrangements that
address any legitimacy gap between the relevant national research ethics framework and
research practice. The focus of these arrangements needs to be on fostering and supporting
reflective practice, not unquestioning rule following.
The experience at Griffith University suggests that it is possible to have a significant
impact upon the climate between researchers and ethics committees, improve client service
and efficiency, and achieve better outcomes, from the adoption of an approach that treats
research ethics as an institutional governance issue.
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